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	<title>Hack the market &#187; books</title>
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	<description>Algorithmic trading experiences</description>
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		<title>easy money</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2009/10/27/easy-money/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2009/10/27/easy-money/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2009 13:35:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dereferenced]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategy development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/?p=698</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There seems to be a developing meme out there suggesting that algorithmic-, and in particular high-frequency, trading is some kind of gold-rush route to easy money which brings to mind&#8230;
&#8230;this revision of a paper I&#8217;d read previously: &#8220;Statistical Arbitrage in the US Equities Market&#8221; by Avellaneda and Lee.   It&#8217;s a detailed and thoroughly worked [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 252px"><img style="margin: 3px 5px;" src="/images/easyMoney.jpg" alt="" width="242" height="300" /><p class="wp-caption-text">you, hf-trading</p></div>
<p>There seems to be a developing meme out there suggesting that algorithmic-, and in particular high-frequency, trading is some kind of gold-rush route to easy money which brings to mind&#8230;</p>
<p>&#8230;this revision of a paper I&#8217;d read previously: <a title="Statistical Arbitrage in the US Equities Market by Avellaneda &amp; Lee" href="/images/AvellanedaLeeStatArb20090616.pdf" target="_blank">&#8220;Statistical Arbitrage in the US Equities Market&#8221;</a> by Avellaneda and Lee.   It&#8217;s a detailed and thoroughly worked (and now re-worked) paper illustrating the development and analysis of a US equity stat-arb strategy based on <a title="Principal Component Analysis" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal_component_analysis" target="_blank">Principal Component Analysis</a> (PCA) and then revised to use ETFs.</p>
<p>I came across this paper as I have still never used PCA in any of my own strategy development work and read Carol Alexander&#8217;s excellent <a title="Market Models, Carol Alexander " href="http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471899755.html" target="_blank"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Market Models</span></a> over my summer vacation with an eye towards giving a PCA hedging model a spin in the near-term. Thus, I wanted another look at this paper as a reference point.  Although it&#8217;s an excellent paper, I&#8217;m not going to urge you to go out and read it immediately unless you have a reasonably pressing practical interest.  Instead, I find it interesting largely because of one of its authors &#8211; Professor Avellaneda &#8211; and its conclusions in the form of its strategies&#8217; performance.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve seen Prof Avellaneda speak a number of times at a variety of quant meetups organized by the relevant <a title="Columbia's Center for Financial Engineering" href="http://www.cfe.columbia.edu/">Columbia</a>/<a title="Courant" href="http://www.cims.nyu.edu/">NYU</a> financial engineering depts.  His paper reminds me that at least once during my noisome adolescent years, my father intoned darkly that:</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>the streets are littered with brilliant minds</strong></p></blockquote>
<p><span id="more-698"></span>Implying that any wits I may believe myself to possess wouldn&#8217;t by themselves be worth much in life and that I&#8217;d need to bring actual <em>tools</em> to the task of solving problems if I wanted to address interesting ones.  Having seen Mr Avellaneda speak, I&#8217;m confident that at my peak, my &#8220;processor&#8221; was never as fast as his.  Much worse, there is no comparison between the tools he can level at a problem compared to me &#8211; he&#8217;s on an entirely different playing field so far as concrete mathematical/analytical capabilities go.  That&#8217;s why I go see him speak and read his papers.</p>
<p>Thus, the <em>results</em> of Avellaneda and Lee&#8217;s work are particularly interesting to me as they&#8217;re really pretty dull: something like a Sharpe of .9 and degrading briskly.  Now, you don&#8217;t expect people to be providing detailed recipes to wildly profitable strategies, and this result isn&#8217;t <em>bad</em>, particularly given that they&#8217;re describing strategies which likely have significant capacity.  Still, it illustrates that very smart people working with sophisticated mathematical tools even over extended periods are still operating under noteworthy constraints.  Perhaps also: ideas are relatively easy &#8211; examining them in the requisite detail is difficult and time consuming, even for (particularly for?) people with the most finely honed toolsets&#8230;</p>
<p>I frequently have friends or colleagues who will observe that if you &#8220;just write a strategy that <em>foos</em> when <em>bar</em> but <em>yaddas</em> when <em>baz</em>&#8230; you should surely make money.&#8221;  Maybe.  But the reality is that just putting together the strategy and <em>working through it</em> takes significant time for anything but the simplest strategies.  Once you add genuine complexity to a strategy, you can spend enormous time tuning it.</p>
<p>This, in turn, poses a dilemma I encounter frequently and honestly don&#8217;t have a great answer for:</p>
<blockquote><p>how to find the balance between continuing development on a known good strategy and initiating the development and analysis of unrelated and novel strategies?</p></blockquote>
<h3>the back of the envelope as canvas</h3>
<p>This next (de-)reference isn&#8217;t directly pertinent to algo trading, but the lessons learned by building <strong>BIG</strong> distributed systems can surely be applied elsewhere.  And they&#8217;re just plain fascinating.</p>
<p>Google&#8217;s Jeff Dean gave a recent talk entitled &#8220;Designs, Lessons and Advice from Building Large Distributed Systems&#8221; at the <span style="font-family: Cambria;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">La</span>rge Scale <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Di</span>stributed                         <span style="text-decoration: underline;">S</span>ystems and Middleware (somehow &#8220;LADIS&#8221;) <a title="LADIS" href="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/ladis2009/" target="_blank">workshop</a> and the slides are <a title="Jeff Dean Keynote LADIS" href="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/ladis2009/talks/dean-keynote-ladis2009.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.   Go read them. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria;">If bald exhortation doesn&#8217;t convince you maybe slide 24 will:</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria;"><img class="aligncenter" src="/images/ladis-slide24.png" alt="" width="497" height="377" /><br />
</span></p>
<p>or perhaps what he does with these baseline numbers in slide 27 will pique your interest:</p>
<div class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 512px"><img src="/images/ladis-slide27.png" alt="back of the envelope as art form" width="502" height="375" /><p class="wp-caption-text">back of the envelope as art form</p></div>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria;">One that made me (a serial prototype-builder) cringe:<br />
</span></p>
<blockquote style="text-align: left;"><p>Important skill: ability to estimate performance of a system design<br />
<span style="color: #ff0000;">– without actually having to build it!</span></p></blockquote>
<p>Ouch.</p>
<h3><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;">maybe it is easy after all</span></span></h3>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;">Of course, if you&#8217;ve studied Avellaneda &amp; Lee&#8217;s paper and it held no challenges or surprises and you&#8217;ve reviewed Mr Dean&#8217;s presentation and it&#8217;s old hat to you, too&#8230;<br />
</span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;"> </span></span></p>
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		<title>Shannon&#8217;s Demon</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2009/03/03/shannons-demon/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2009/03/03/shannons-demon/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2009 14:29:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dereferenced]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[monte-carlo methods]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategy development]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/?p=392</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
During some recent travels, I read William Poundstone&#8217;s ramblingly entertaining Fortune&#8217;s Formula.  It had been sitting on my shelf after I&#8217;d originally gotten it, perused it and offhandedly discarded it as yet another of these science-is-fun-and-full-of-wacky-characters books for the butch humanities student.  My initial impression was a bit harsh as the book proved entertaining and [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><applet width="500" height="500" code="examples.sd" archive="/randomWalk/sd.jar" codebase="sd"></applet></p>
<p>During some recent travels, I read William Poundstone&#8217;s ramblingly entertaining <a title="Fortune's Formula" href="http://www.amazon.com/Fortunes-Formula-Scientific-Betting-Casinos/dp/0809045990/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1236042231&amp;sr=8-1" target="_blank">Fortune&#8217;s Formula</a>.  It had been sitting on my shelf after I&#8217;d originally gotten it, perused it and offhandedly discarded it as yet another of these science-is-fun-and-full-of-wacky-characters books for the butch humanities student.  My initial impression was a bit harsh as the book proved entertaining and covered a lot of ground including significant coverage of Ed Thorp and his stat arb alchemy (see <a title="a stat arb story" href="http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/07/12/a-stat-arb-story/" target="_blank">here </a>for his own papers on the topic).</p>
<p>One of the more compelling segments of the book relates <a title="Claude Shannon" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude_Shannon" target="_blank">Claude Shannon</a>&#8217;s <strong><em>demon</em></strong> which is a nice thought-experiment / trading-strategy which illustrates the tractability of the problem of trading on a random walk market with fixed properties.  I wrote the above applet to explore the impacts of applying friction and otherwise modifying the behaviors of the market and the demon.</p>
<p>The original demon posited a world with no friction in which the market contains one instrument which doubled or halved in value each day.  Shannon&#8217;s demon looks to take advantage of this volatility by maintaining a portfolio which was rebalanced each day to ensure a 50/50 split between cash and the market.  The applet implements a very simple monte-carlo test-bed for Shannon&#8217;s Demon.  You can configure the demon and the marketplace along a variety of parameters, and then run many instances of the demon, each on its own self-contained random-walk market.</p>
<p>Although Shannon&#8217;s demon is a highly &#8220;stylized&#8221; case in the sense that it operates on a very synthetic, unrealistic and favorable formulation of a random-walk marketplace, it has spawned a great deal of interest and serious research.</p>
<p>Most of all, it&#8217;s a revealing illustration of the kind of reasoning one must embrace in order to address stat arb strategy development.  Enjoy.</p>
<p>&#8212;<br />
Updated: March 4th &#8211; made price axis logarithmic to better reveal mc paths.</p>
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		<title>Every sunken ship&#8217;s got a room full of charts</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/11/12/every-sunken-ships-got-a-room-full-of-charts/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/11/12/every-sunken-ships-got-a-room-full-of-charts/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2008 18:47:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategy development]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/?p=107</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
I came across this gem of a quote in a comment on the big picture and it reminded me, somewhat circuitously, of another one of the things I view as axiomatic about algorithmic trading.
In The Alchemy of Finance, George Soros observed that one of his advantages as a trader was that while he held beliefs strongly, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: left;"><img class="aligncenter" title="Every sunken ships got a room full of charts" src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/images/Cari_Chart.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="312" /></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">I came across this gem of a quote in a <a href="http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2008/11/open-thread-what-now/#comment-125143" target="_blank">comment on the big picture</a> and it reminded me, somewhat circuitously, of <a title="Portfolio: atomic element of a trading strategy" href="http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/09/13/portfolio-atomic-element-of-a-trading-strategy/" target="_blank">another one</a> of the things I view as axiomatic about algorithmic trading.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">In <a title="Amazon link" href="http://www.amazon.com/Alchemy-Finance-Reading-Mind-Market/dp/0471042064" target="_blank">The Alchemy of Finance</a>, George Soros observed that one of his advantages as a trader was that while he held beliefs strongly, he was also capable of abandoning or even reversing them quickly as conditions evolved.  An algorithmic trader needs something like this but more so &#8211; an automated trader is best served free of opinions entirely.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">I think this is why the sunken ship quote made me think of this.  While charts are an effective means of quickly communicating potentially a great deal of information to a human viewer, the cult of chart technicians and the endless supply of books, lecture series and training materials they actually make their money on might convince you that you can form your opinions based on chart patterns&#8230;</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><span id="more-107"></span></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">And so you can!  Whether this is a good way to trade is another matter entirely.  For the &#8220;mouse trader,&#8221; I suppose it might be, and I certainly won&#8217;t argue it one way or the other.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">But for an algorithmic trader, the only kind of opinion that matters isn&#8217;t about a particular chart formation or even fundamental factors driving a particular market.  The only opinion that matters for an algo trader is the firm conviction in the deployed algorithm and the methodology employed to develop it.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">A few years ago a study (discussed <a title="Article on study" href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article568218.ece?token=null&amp;offset=0&amp;page=1" target="_blank">here</a>, actual study <a title="Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion" href="http://sds.hss.cmu.edu/media/pdfs/Loewenstein/shivetal_InvestmentBehavior.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>) revealed that brain damage which limited emotive function seemed to correlate <em>positively </em>with investment performance.  From the article:</p>
<blockquote>
<p style="text-align: left;">&#8220;Antoine Bechara, an associate Professor of Neurology at Iowa, suggested that successful investors in the stock market might plausibly be called &#8216;functional psychopaths&#8217;.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p style="text-align: left;">Charming, right?</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">We have an out: we don&#8217;t have to be the &#8220;functional psychopaths,&#8221; we just have to write them and then have the self-control to let them do their thing.  One of the big benefits of algorithmic trading is that fear and greed are taken right out of the equation.  Unless, of course, the person operating the algos loses her mettle mid-stream and shuts things off precipitously or starts ill-advisedly twisting at the knobs on the side of the box&#8230;</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">The only opinion relevant for us is the one that fortifies our belief in the system in the face of whatever the markets happen to throw at it.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">I might have a view about, say, crude based on some sort of fundamental or geopolitical perspective, but it will affect my trading precisely as much as my opinions about Eli vs. Payton Manning &#8211; not at all!</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">
<p style="text-align: left;">
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		<title>entrepreneur&#8217;s inspiration</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/10/06/entrepreneurs-inspiration/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/10/06/entrepreneurs-inspiration/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 17:44:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dereferenced]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[our managed markets]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog-test/?p=95</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
I was looking for a couple of books on amazon today and came across this offering of a hoodie (pictured above) which reads: &#8220;I helped bailout the banking system and all I got was this lousy tee shirt!&#8221; which I&#8217;d (admittedly more rancorously) suggested only a few days ago&#8230;

Just as curious, the search that revealed [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img title="looks like a hoodie to me..." alt="looks like a hoodie to me..." src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/images/lousytshirt.jpg" /></p>
<p>I was looking for a couple of books on amazon today and came across <a title="bailout hoodie" target="_blank" href="http://www.amazon.com/Helped-Banking-System-Lousy-Hoodie/dp/B001GZRH86/ref=sr_1_30?ie=UTF8&#038;s=apparel&#038;qid=1223306825&#038;sr=8-30">this offering</a> of a hoodie (pictured above) which reads: &#8220;I helped bailout the banking system and all I got was this lousy tee shirt!&#8221; which I&#8217;d (admittedly more rancorously) suggested only a <a title="we're here to help" target="_blank" href="http://puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/09/28/were-here-to-help/">few days ago</a>&#8230;</p>
<p><a target="_blank" title="Amazon link" href="http://www.amazon.com/Hedge-Funds-Perspective-Financial-Engineering/dp/0691132941/ref=pd_bbs_sr_6?ie=UTF8&#038;s=books&#038;qid=1223307561&#038;sr=8-6"><img align="left" src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/images/loHedgeFundsAP.jpg" /></a></p>
<p>Just as curious, the search that revealed this gem was meant to find books similar to one I&#8217;ve recently read by Dr. Andrew Lo, &#8220;Hedge Funds: an Analytic Perspective&#8221; (pictured left) and which, like all of his work, I found interesting and informative.  I&#8217;m not sure exactly how Amazon matched these two products together, but it&#8217;s funny to imagine that the same people buying the one are also buying the other!</p>
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		<title>When Hedge Funds Blow</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/04/26/when-hedge-funds-blow/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/04/26/when-hedge-funds-blow/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Apr 2008 14:49:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[guests]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[portfolio management]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog-test/?p=59</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ IMG {  text-align:center;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:3px;  margin-top:3px;  margin-right:10px;  margin-left:0px;  direction:ltr } .intro {  text-align:left;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:30px;  font-style: italic; }  .title {  text-align:center;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:20px;  margin-top:20px;  margin-left: auto;  font-weight:bold;  font-size: larger; }  .year {  text-align:center; [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<style type="text/css"> IMG {  text-align:center;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:3px;  margin-top:3px;  margin-right:10px;  margin-left:0px;  direction:ltr } .intro {  text-align:left;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:30px;  font-style: italic; }  .title {  text-align:center;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:20px;  margin-top:20px;  margin-left: auto;  font-weight:bold;  font-size: larger; }  .year {  text-align:center;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:10px;  margin-left: auto;  font-weight:bold;  font-size: large; }  .fund {  text-align:left;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:3px;  margin-top:10px;  font-weight:bold; } .story {  text-align:left;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:3px;  margin-left: 10; }  .cod {  text-align:left;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:10px;  margin-top:10px;  font-style:italic; }  .normal {  text-align:left;  vertical-align:top;  margin-bottom:10px;  margin-top:5px; }  </style>
<div class="intro"><img hspace="10" align="left" alt="boom" title="boom" src="/images/boom.jpg" /> I&#8217;m very pleased to present our first   guest blogger to this space &#8211; Scott Johnston.  Scott&#8217;s an   experienced hedge fund exec who&#8217;s currently a PM and principal at   the <a target="_blank" title="The Belstar Group" href="http://www.belstargroup.com">Belstar Group</a>, an asset   allocator and fund-of-funds.  This post has been excerpted, with   permission, from his monthly newsletter. Contact him at sjohnston   {AT} belstargroup [DOT] com.</div>
<div class="normal">The biggest single impediment I see for investors contemplating an investment into hedge funds is &#8220;blow up&#8221; risk. How can they think otherwise, with all the hype? The media enjoy little more than the self-immolation of a hedge fund &#8211; <em>Rich Guys Get Theirs!</em> Blow-ups score a 10 on the CNBC schadenfreude scale. (Note: for institutional investors, blow up risk translates more specifically into &#8220;headline risk,&#8221; which is basically the risk of losing one&#8217;s job if a hedge fund you invested in ends up in the papers for the wrong reason.)</div>
<div class="normal">How common are hedge fund blow-ups? How often do they happen?  What do they do to returns? These are questions I wanted to get to the bottom of.</div>
<div class="normal">Fishing around, I found surprisingly little research on the subject, so I thought it might be useful to conduct a survey of our own. Specifically, we will look at hedge fund blow-ups through the years to see what kind of conclusions we can draw. For the sake of argument, we will call anything greater than a 50% loss a blow-up.</div>
<p><span id="more-59"></span></p>
<div class="title">Hedge Fund Blow-Ups &#8211; A Brief Historical Survey</div>
<div class="year">1994</div>
<div class="fund">Askin Capital Management</div>
<div class="story">David Askin, a star mortgage trader of the day, can lay claim to being the father of the modern hedge fund blow up. Interestingly, the industry had gone from its inception in 1948 to 1994 without a notable hair ball. (Of course, the industry was tiny back then.) Askin ran a mortgage fund that specialized in some of the complex mortgage instruments that had recently come into existence. If this doesn&#8217;t sound familiar, perhaps you&#8221;ve just returned from a long vacation. The Fed raised rates unexpectedly, crushing the risky &#8211; principal only &#8211; tranches in which Askin had loaded up, with leverage.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $600 million<br />
Cause of death: Excessive leverage, concentration</div>
<div class="year">1997</div>
<div class="fund">Niederhoffer Investments</div>
<div class="story">Famed investor, author, squash champion and philodox Victor Niederhoffer gets squashed himself by a leveraged bet on Thai stocks.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $130 million<br />
Cause of death: Excessive leverage, concentration</div>
<div class="year">1998</div>
<div class="fund">Long Term Capital Management</div>
<div class="story">The <em>ne plus ultra</em> of hedge fund blow-ups. John Merriwether&#8217;s LTCM cratered when third world credit problems led to a sudden repricing of risk. Their book, seemingly diversified, was basically long risk and short safety. 40-1 leverage (accounts vary) led to margin calls they couldn&#8217;t meet and, subsequently, a Fed-engineered bailout by Wall Street. <a title="When Genius Failed" target="_blank" href="http://www.amazon.com/When-Genius-Failed-Long-Term-Management/dp/0375758259/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&#038;s=books&#038;qid=1209154512&#038;sr=8-1">When Genius Failed</a>, an account of the collapse, is recommended reading.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $4.6 billion<br />
Cause of death: Excessive leverage</div>
<div class="year">2000</div>
<div class="fund">Manhattan Fund</div>
<div class="story">Run by Michael Berger, a native Austrian, this fund shorted technology stocks from 1996-1999.  Oops, a tad little early on that trade. Losses prompted Berger to falsify his track record, which caught up with him by 3000. Arrested, he skipped bail and remained on the lam until he was caught last year in Austria.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $400 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Laser Advisors</div>
<div class="story">Run by former Goldman partner Michael Smirlock, Laser concealed a series of bad bets on options by falsifying position prices on exotic securities. Smirlock spent three years in the Big House and now does charity work.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $70 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Ashbury Capital Partners</div>
<div class="story">This one, at $8 million, is a rounding error but it&#8217;s too funny to leave out. Manager Mark Yagalla told investors he had averaged 80% in his personal account for nine years. He was 23 years old.  Hmm. He blew most of the money on his girlfriend, a Playboy centerfold by the name of Sandy Bentley. Among other thing he bought her furs and, yes, a Bentley, which she promptly sold for cash. Yagalla bought himself a helicopter. When his assets were seized the centerfold dumped him, news of which was promptly reported to Ripley&#8217;s Believe it or Not.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $8 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Marque Partners</div>
<div class="story">Rob Littel, a pal of JFK junior&#8217;s, had a magic black box that promised to churn out 20% returns regardless of market direction, only he wouldn&#8217;t explain it to anyone. Which makes sense, since all his box did, apparently, was eat money. Shortly thereafter he started lying about returns. Pleading poverty, he paid a paltry fine to the SEC. Immediately after this, he signed a book deal for a nice advance to write about JFK&#8217;s secrets, a book called &#8220;The Men We Became.&#8221; From ripping off investors to selling out a dead friend, Littel is currently not considered a candidate for the Integrity Hall of Fame.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $120 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="year">2001</div>
<div class="fund">Integral Investment Management</div>
<div class="story">The Chicago Art Institute suffered most of the loss here when this relatively unknown fund turned out to be a low-level scam. The term &#8220;headline risk&#8221; became widely used after this case, as the Institute had egg all over its face. The fund-of-funds industry, with its implicit protection from embarrassment, took off in the aftermath.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $70 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Lancer Group</div>
<div class="story">Lead manager Michael Lauer manipulated the prices of penny stocks to inflate investment performance. Morgan Stanley got taken in by this one, as did former Sotheby&#8217;&#8217;s Chairman Al Taubman.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $300 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="year">2002</div>
<div class="fund">Lipper Convertible Fund</div>
<div class="story">Ken Lipper was a former Deputy Mayor of New York City. He was a former Salomon Brothers partner and Columbia professor. He even wrote the book &#8220;Wall Street&#8221; that later became the Oliver Stone movie. (Greed is good!) None of this meant, apparently, that he wasn&#8217;t a scam artist. His fund got killed in the convertibles market so he started falsifying returns. Julia Roberts got taken in by this one which, I know, is hard to believe.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $350 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Beacon Hill Asset Management</div>
<div class="story">These guys got tripped up by the mortgage market (I sense a developing theme&#8230;) and started falsifying returns. Does that ever work out? Just curious. Lots of institutional names got caught up in this one, and it ranks as the biggest fraud to date.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $800 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Eifuku Master Fund</div>
<div class="story">This was a Japanese fund, the name of which, if only slightly mispronounced, must have phonetically captured the sentiments of its founders. (Do not try to figure this out in front of your children, at least not out loud).</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $300 million<br />
Cause of Death: Concentration, excessive leverage</div>
<div class="year">2004</div>
<div class="fund">Sterling Watters</div>
<div class="story">Angelo Haligiannis, a college drop-out from Queens, raised $27 million, mostly from friends and family, by lying about his returns. Haligiannis skipped on his bail and was arrested two years later in Greece.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $27 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="year">2005</div>
<div class="fund">Portus Group</div>
<div class="story">Set up as a Canadian hedge fund for the little guy, Portus accepted investments for as little as $5000. Money allegedly used to buy stocks was diverted to pay expenses.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $150 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Bayou Group</div>
<div class="story">Your basic Ponzi scheme with returns fabricated to cover losses. Only these guys took it a step further: they actually started their own accounting firm &#8211; complete with the waspy, fiduciary sounding name of &#8220;Richmond Fairfield&#8221; &#8211;  sign off on fraudulent audits. Founder Sam Israel was just sentenced to 20 years.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $450 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="fund">Wood River</div>
<div class="story">How&#8217;&#8217;s this for a hedge fund strategy: put 80% of your money in one high tech stock. That&#8217;s exactly what Wood River did, investing in a stock called Endwave, which promptly fell from $54 to $10 a share. One problem was that the fund&#8217;s marketing materials spoke much about benefits of diversification. Another was that Wood River never bothered to tell the SEC they owned 45% of Endwave.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $300 million<br />
Cause of Death: Concentration, fraud</div>
<div class="fund">KL Group</div>
<div class="story">This one was fraud from the outset. Perhaps recognizing their own limitations, they never even tried to make money. The proprietors, three Koreans, skimmed $150 million from the Palm Beach society crowd, all the while claiming 125% returns (note to future scammers: don&#8221;t overreach, 25% is far more credible, and the Ponzi scheme will last longer). Money was used to live large, however briefly.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $130 million<br />
Cause of Death: Fraud</div>
<div class="year">2006</div>
<div class="fund">Matador Fund</div>
<div class="story">Famed investor, squash player&#8230; wait, this guy again? Victor Niederhoffer becomes the first hedge fund operator to blow up twice.</div>
<div style="text-align: center"><img title="Blow-up Artist Niederhoffer" alt="Blow-up Artist Niederhoffer" src="/images/philodox.jpg" /></div>
<div style="text-align: center">Blow-up Artist Niederhoffer</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $190 million<br />
Cause of Death: Excessive leverage</div>
<div class="fund">MotherRock L.P.</div>
<div class="story">Big bet on natural gas futures goes the wrong way.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $230 million<br />
Cause of Death: Concentration, excessive leverage</div>
<div class="fund">Amaranth Advisors</div>
<div class="story">A sophisticated, $9 billion hedge fund in Greenwich gives most of their capital to a 29 year-old energy trader in Canada, who then makes a gigantic spread bet on natural gas futures with 8-1leverage. Ka-Boom.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $6.4 billion<br />
Cause of Death Concentration, excessive leverage</div>
<div class="year">2007</div>
<div class="fund">Sowood</div>
<div class="story">Caught off guard by a sudden widening in credit spreads (see Long Term Capital), Sowood announced a 57% loss. Founded by ex-Harvard endowment wiz Jeff Larson, the fund counted Harvard as one of their core investors. Harvard took a $350 million hit, which amounted to a 1% hit to their endowment.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $1.5 billion<br />
Cause of Death: Excessive leverage</div>
<div class="fund">Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund</div>
<div class="story">This mouthful of a fund was the canary in the coal mine of the credit crisis last February. A big bet on subprime mortgages goes horribly wrong.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $1.6 billion<br />
Cause of Death Concentration, excessive leverage</div>
<div class="year">2008</div>
<div class="fund">Carlyle Capital Group</div>
<div class="story">This $230 million fund was founded in 3006 by the eminence grises of the private equity arena, the Carlyle Group. The purpose was to buy mortgages using tons of leverage. Oops.</div>
<div class="cod">Losses: $220 million<br />
Cause of Death: Excessive leverage</div>
<div class="year">&#8230;</div>
<div class="normal">You should be seeing a theme here: hedge fund blow-ups are almost always caused by fraud or excessive leverage (concentration is also listed, but almost all these examples would have survived with less leverage). Also notice that of the non-frauds, every blow-up was in a fixed income related fund, especially in the mortgage area.</div>
<div class="normal">A critical point here, though, is that the money lost in the non-fraud cases was not actually lost by the industry as a whole. Invariably, these losses were in instruments like futures (from whence the leverage), where every loser has a winner on the other side of the trade. So Amaranth&#8217;&#8217;s pain was someone else&#8217;s gain, and that someone else was more than likely another hedge fund. When Bear&#8217;s hedge fund was blowing up because of sub-prime, John Paulson&#8217;s fund was on its way to the biggest payday in hedge fund history for exactly the same reason. So you see, most blow-up risk is really fund-specific. It is not an industry risk.</div>
<div class="normal">Ergo, blow-up risk is really only about fraud.</div>
<div class="normal">Hunt Taylor was a well-respected hedge industry veteran, known as a real free thinker. I was fortunate enough to have met him casually before his tragic death in a motorcycle crash last year. Hunt was perhaps the first person to put fraud blow-ups in context. Specifically, he added up all the blow-ups to assess the overall impact on the industry. I have taken the liberty to add to his work here:</div>
<div class="fund">Fraud Losses as a Percentage of Hedge Fund Industry Assets</div>
<div style="text-align: center"><img title="Fraud Losses as a Percentage of Hedge Fund Industry Assets" alt="Fraud Losses as a Percentage of Hedge Fund Industry Assets" src="/images/hf-tbl.gif" /></div>
<div class="intro">Source: Hennessee Group</div>
<div class="normal">No doubt I missed a few small ones, but they won&#8217;t add up to much. The big point here is that fraud-related blow-ups have been 0.039% annual drag on industry performance since 1994.  That&#8217;s 4 basis points. If you add up all the losses it comes to $2.9 billion. That&#8217;s a big number, right? No, it&#8217;s not. A couple of weeks ago, GE dropped 14% in one day. Know how much investors lost? $47 billion!</div>
<div class="normal">This is worth restating: <em>all the hedge fund fraud losses since the dawn of the industry add up to about 1/20th of what GE cost investors in a single day.</em></div>
<div class="normal">And yet institutional investors galore own GE but won&#8217;t touch hedge funds because they are terrified of fraud, which they call &#8220;headline risk.&#8221;</div>
<div class="normal">There are lots of things in life to worry about, but unless you are someone like a fund-of-funds manager, hedge fund fraud isn&#8217;t one of them.</div>
<div class="intro">- Scott Johnston</div>
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		<title>laughter in the dark</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/02/26/laughter-in-the-dark/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2008/02/26/laughter-in-the-dark/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2008 13:56:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dereferenced]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[options pricing]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog-test/?p=44</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
Professor DeLong  points out that Emanuel Derman has begun posting lecture notes to classes he&#8217;s teaching as part of the Columbia Master&#8217;s of Financial Engineering.   If you&#8217;re even remotely interested in financial engineering or algorithmic trading, then you should read Dr. Derman&#8217;s engrossing book &#8220;My Life as a Quant&#8221; as it gives [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ederman.com/new/docs/laughter.html"><img title="Lips (Heure de l'Observatoire) - Man Ray" alt="Lips (Heure de l'Observatoire) - Man Ray" src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/images/manray.jpg" /></a></p>
<p>Professor DeLong  <a title="Brad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal" target="_blank" href="http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2008/02/introduction-to.html">points out</a> that <a target="_blank" title="Emanuel Derman's blog" href="http://www.wilmott.com/blogs/eman/">Emanuel Derman</a> has begun posting <a title="Lecture notes from Columbia Master's in Financial Engineering" target="_blank" href="http://www.ederman.com/new/docs/laughter.html">lecture notes</a> to classes he&#8217;s teaching as part of the Columbia <a title="Columbia Master's of Financial Engineering" target="_blank" href="http://www.ieor.columbia.edu/pages/graduate/ms_financial_eng/index.html">Master&#8217;s of Financial Engineering</a>.   If you&#8217;re even remotely interested in financial engineering or algorithmic trading, then you should read Dr. Derman&#8217;s engrossing book <a target="_blank" title="His life as a quant" href="http://www.amazon.com/My-Life-Quant-Reflections-Physics/dp/0470192739/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&#038;s=books&#038;qid=1204053905&#038;sr=8-1">&#8220;My Life as a Quant&#8221;</a> as it gives a unique and personal perspective on the explosion of engineering as a discipline within finance.  I haven&#8217;t studied his notes carefully yet but a cursory examination suggests they look very worthwhile.</p>
<p>I recently found in my inbox an invitation to study for a <a target="_blank" title="CQF" href="http://www.7city.com/cqf.php?area=quants&#038;outline=cqf&#038;course=cqf">Certificate in Quantitative Finance</a> which is, I&#8217;m sure, a great program.  But it&#8217;s pretty pricey and any quant should be aware of costs!  Laughing in the dark might be a reasonable alternative to shelling out for a more structured offering&#8230;</p>
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		<title>A trading strategy is an option</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/10/10/a-trading-strategy-is-an-option/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/10/10/a-trading-strategy-is-an-option/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:34:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[back-testing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[monte-carlo methods]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[open-source software]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[options pricing]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[strategy development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog-test/?p=27</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
The best way to reason about a trading strategy&#8217;s performance, that is valuing it, is as an option.
Or perhaps as a collection or portfolio of them.
I have to assume that people reading this have a working idea of what an option is, so I&#8217;m not going to provide definitions that can be readily found elsewhere. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img alt="options, options, ..." title="options, options, ..." src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/blog/images/oneway.jpg" /></p>
<p>The best way to reason about a trading strategy&#8217;s <em>performance</em>, that is <strong><em>valuing</em></strong> it, is as an option.</p>
<p>Or perhaps as a collection or portfolio of them.</p>
<p>I have to assume that people reading this have a working idea of what an option is, so I&#8217;m not going to provide definitions that can be readily found <a target="_blank" title="option definition" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Option_%28finance%29">elsewhere.</a> I will note that my favorite book on the trading of options is by <a target="_blank" title="Option Market Making" href="http://www.amazon.com/Option-Market-Making-Financial-Commodity/dp/0471578320/ref=pd_bbs_sr_4/102-4760953-2767316?ie=UTF8&#038;s=books&#038;qid=1192021949&#038;sr=8-4">Allen Jan Baird.</a></p>
<p>Let&#8217;s consider the three illustrative trading strategies we&#8217;ve looked at up until now.  The trend-following strategy suffered many little losses and then enjoyed a big win.  Sounds like buying options. The mean-reverting strategy made lots of little profits and then risked getting clobbered with a big loss.  Sounds like someone who&#8217;s writing options.  And the first strategy we <a title="morning range breakout" href="http://puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/10/02/anatomy-of-a-knockout/">looked at</a>, the morning range breakout, had a payoff which looked like a long straddle or strangle where the break-evens were near the observed high and lows for the session (where we set our entry stops).</p>
<p><img title="straddle payoff" alt="straddle payoff" src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/blog/images/straddle.gif" /></p>
<p>Now, there&#8217;s obvious differences between the trading strategies&#8217; payoff structures as compared to the similar options strategies.  There&#8217;s no premium, for instance, and that&#8217;s clearly significant.  The morning range breakout seems to exhibit a sort of knockout effect when a position has been entered but then the market reverses and you&#8217;re &#8220;knocked-out&#8221; of your position.  You just take a loss and do not collect even if the market turns back in your direction.  With a straddle you don&#8217;t have this behavior.  There are differences and they are worth keeping in mind.  But the reasons for viewing trading strategies as options portfolios are many and compelling.</p>
<p>The superficial reason, as I mentioned, is that the basic payout structures are potentially similar.  The deep reason is that ultimately the problems are the same &#8211; how to value complex instruments with engineered payouts.  And the pragmatic reason is that many many very smart people have applied their considerable brains and diverse skill-sets to advancing options pricing techniques.  There&#8217;s also a great deal of high quality software available <a target="_blank" title="QuantLib" href="http://www.quantlib.org">out there</a> which can be used to adapt these time-proven techniques to your own algorithmic trading strategy valuations.</p>
<p>The techniques which we&#8217;ve seen up until now, back-testing and parameter optimization, are sort of  weak cousins of a family of techniques long used for options pricing: Monte-Carlo (MC) methods.  MC simulation can clearly be used to assess a trading strategy&#8217;s performance.</p>
<p>In subsequent posts, we&#8217;ll talk about some of the details of each of these techniques and about some of their respective trade-offs.  That should keep my pump primed for a bit, but in the meanwhile I leave you with a parting inquiry: what other options pricing techniques might we apply to our algorithmic trading practices?</p>
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		<title>distribution</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/10/05/distribution/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/10/05/distribution/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Oct 2007 13:29:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[back-testing]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[strategy development]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog-test/?p=23</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I&#8217;ll make a few more comments on the last strategy we looked at before we move on.  Although I&#8217;ve panned it, it&#8217;s actually a nice strategy for consideration as it&#8217;s very simple to implement, efficient to run, has a plausible-ish sounding premise and can be permuted in many directions.  It has the unfortunate [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img align="left" alt="misleading, eh?" title="misleading, eh?" src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/blog/images/truck.jpeg" />I&#8217;ll make a few more comments on the last strategy we looked at before we move on.  Although I&#8217;ve panned it, it&#8217;s actually a nice strategy for consideration as it&#8217;s very simple to implement, efficient to run, has a plausible-ish sounding premise and can be permuted in many directions.  It has the unfortunate characteristic of being a loser, but nothing is perfect.  It might offset that characteristic by providing us with a means of seeing interesting phenomena or learning.  For example, all of the futures exchanges I ran it against &#8211; ICE, CME and NYX performed very well.  Might be something there.  Or not.  If we look at the distribution of the *best* performing of each of the 4 strategies we ran by instrument, we get a pretty clear picture:</p>
<p><img align="middle" title="gimme an R-..." alt="gimme an R-..." src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/blog/images/ambodist.png" /></p>
<p><span id="more-23"></span></p>
<p>This is each of the individual *executions* which the strategies made.  On average, including fees &#038; commissions, they lost 7-odd dollars per round-turn.  Not good, and this was the best of the group.  Pretty conclusive to me.</p>
<p>(This problem which I&#8217;ve tried to illustrate here &#8211; the data mining problem &#8211; is nicely discussed in chapter six of David Aronson&#8217;s &#8220;Evidence-Based Technical Analysis.&#8221;)</p>
<p>The next pair of strategies are inspired by a number of papers written by <a title="Prof. Peter Stone " target="_blank" href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~pstone/">Prof Peter Stone</a> in which he discusses market-making strategies.  In his usage, a strategy is a market maker if it always maintains a bid and an ask in the market.  We&#8217;re going to take this idea and create two very simple strategies: one which is a market maker which hopes to profit on reversion and one which will instead look to profit on trends.</p>
<p><strong>Non-predictive mean-reverting market maker</strong></p>
<p>This strategy is roughly based on <a target="_blank" title="mm agent" href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~pstone/Papers/bib2html-links/AMEC03.pdf">this paper</a>; it will always maintain a limit bid and a limit ask below and above the market respectively.  The spread is adjusted by an optimizable parameter set by a user or perhaps an optimizer or other program.  In the version I&#8217;m considering, we have three parameters to consider:  what to trade (contract), minimum spread in ticks (integer) and an opaque adjustment factor which is a double.  The adjustment factor will basically skew the spread away from the market based on my position in order to limit my inventory.  For example, if the market is trading at $100 and I place my bid at 99 and my ask at 101 and my bid gets filled, my subsequent bid might be 2 dollars away from the market.  Presumably the market will be more likely to hit my ask and reduce my inventory.  As my position grows, the adjuster will continue to move me further away from the market.  So, if the market bounces around this strategy will do well.  If instead, the market shoots off in one direction or the other, then this strategy will get hurt badly.</p>
<p><strong>Non-predictive trend follower</strong></p>
<p>This strategy is essentially the inverse of the mean-reverting market maker.   At all times it maintains a buy-stop above the market and a sell-stop below the market.  Its behavior is not surprisingly roughly the mirror image of the other strategy &#8211; if the market shoots off in some direction, we profit and if it bounces aimlessly then we get hurt.</p>
<p><strong>Oddments </strong></p>
<p>A few final observations about these strategies before I conclude this post..  The first is their <em>non-predictive</em> nature.   They are non-predictive in the sense that there is no predictive model underlying their &#8220;decision-making&#8221; such as it is.  All the same, as we&#8217;ll see, they both exhibit noteworthy behavior in spite of their relatively dumb modus operandi.</p>
<p>Another thing worth noting is that in order to simulate the execution of these strategies, we need to have an exchange simulator which will support limit and stop orders.  We do, so it&#8217;s not an issue, but there are reasonable concerns  one should have when looking at the simulated results of such strategies.  I&#8217;ll leave it at that for now, and in some later post I&#8217;ll discuss some of the implementation details of an exchange simulator and how a strategy developer can avoid pitfalls associated with simulated conditional orders.</p>
<p>Next time, we&#8217;ll look at some concrete results of these two strategies.</p>
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		<title>Sucker punch! (an example)</title>
		<link>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/09/26/sucker-punch-an-example/</link>
		<comments>http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/09/26/sucker-punch-an-example/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Sep 2007 04:20:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>tito</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[back-testing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[performance analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategy development]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.puppetmastertrading.com/blog-test/?p=17</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[To illustrate what I was talking about last time, I introduce a simple example: the morning breakout strategy.  Variations on this strategy have been discussed in a variety of sources from Perry Kaufman&#8217;s encyclopedic tome to a recent copy of Futures Magazine.
The rationale behind this strategy is based on the premise that the first [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To illustrate what I was talking about <a href="http://puppetmastertrading.com/blog/2007/09/26/fools-gold/">last time</a>, I introduce a simple example: the morning breakout strategy.  Variations on this strategy have been discussed in a variety of sources from <a title="Perry Kaufman's encyclopedic tome" target="_blank" href="http://www.amazon.com/New-Trading-Systems-Methods-Wiley/dp/047126847X/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/104-9521177-7282342?ie=UTF8&#038;s=books&#038;qid=1190830692&#038;sr=8-1">Perry Kaufman&#8217;s encyclopedic tome</a> to a recent copy of Futures Magazine.</p>
<p>The rationale behind this strategy is based on the premise that the first <em><strong>n</strong></em> minutes of a trading session will frequently see the entire movement for the session and that thus breakouts from this range will prove to be decisive for the day.  One can take this basic idea and create a bewildering array of strategies by adding pre-trade filters and all sorts of exits.</p>
<p>They all have the same basic feature: they&#8217;re losers.</p>
<p><img align="middle" alt="Sucker punch!" title="Sucker punch!" src="http://puppetmastertrading.com/images/suckerPunch.gif" /></p>
<p>We&#8217;ll stay simple and assume that our strategy will set stops at the observed max &#038; min of the session after <strong>n</strong> minutes of the session have passed.  At the end of the day, we&#8217;ll exit any position the strategy has<br />
initiated.  And for maximal simplicity (and perhaps some psychological sense of &#8220;safety&#8221;) we&#8217;ll allow the stops to stay in the market all day so they act as stop-losses for each other when positions are entered.</p>
<p>Thus our strategy has two optimizable parameters: <em>what to trade </em>and <em>when</em> to set the stops.  The first is of type contract and the second is an integer.  Finally, we have some fixed parameters (i.e., it doesn&#8217;t make sense to try to optimize them) denoting when the session starts and how much money to risk or how many shares or contracts to trade.</p>
<p>If we do a parameter optimization on this strategy using, say, the s&#038;p 500 components as values for the first parameter and setting the <em><strong>n</strong></em> breakout range to values { 20, 40, 60, 80 } we end up with 500 X 4 distinct strategies which each get back-tested to produce our results.</p>
<p>In the next post,  we&#8217;ll review the results and consider how to reason about them.</p>
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