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dingbat kabuki

January 28th, 2010

Like many Americans, last night I dutifully switched on my TV at 9pm to see the State of our Union.  Always a spectacle, America’s leadership have upped the surreality ante with the bizarre backdrop of Biden lip-synching amiably in the background whilst Madame Speaker sat with all the calm collection of a fish on a hook and never seemed fully in control of herself or her eyebrows.  The spectacle of would’ve-been king McCain sitting there and glowering openly at the lecturn as his confederates sat in stony silence while their ‘opposition’ applauded like drunken high schoolers at a home coming at every mundane utterance proved a bit much and I had turned off the glowing beacon of groupthink by 9:25 and gone to investigate something on my computer.  I was surprised and delighted to see that it was still available: dingbatkabuki.com

Dingbat Kabuki and other structural market hacks

When I first started puppetmaster trading, one of my dearest friends, a Yale-educated economist and professor of same, asked me an important question.  He asked:

In the markets, there are always ‘insiders’ who have the ability to trade on knowledge that you can’t know or with an advantage that you can’t have.  How are you going to compete with these players?

I provided a variety of answers, but at the time my conception of the universe of people with both inside knowledge and the ability to trade on it was limited to cases like that of Mr Rajaratnam.  I believed that cases like these were constrained by clear laws that were duly surveilled and prosecuted by the appropriate authorities.  The problem seemed like a very real one, but constrained in size and not essential to my enterprise.  I still hope that my belief of the time was true, but since then I’ve certainly understood that there’s more than one way to hack the market.

For some, a market hack might consist of some kind of simple (or complex) algorithm(s) applied to some set of markets.  But this really isn’t a hack so much as it’s a trading strategy – like many that have long existed – only that it’s now implemented in software where originally it would have been implemented in wetware.  While implementing trading strategies in software does open up new vistas in terms of the kinds of strategies that you can look to implement – computers are faster than people by a noteworthy amount in many tasks – but, for the most part, you’re really still just trading and when you take on positions, you are still bearing risk.  You might be ‘hacking’ but it’s really not a market hack as I’ve come to appreciate.

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execution quality, market structure, our managed markets, post-trade analysis

“the SEC made Madoff”

January 17th, 2010

Bill Harts, a friend of mine who has, as they say, forgotten more about electronic trading and market structure than most will ever be burdened by, has recently taken an interest in the public letters written to the SEC in response to their requests for public comments on dark pools.  Mostly, these letters are funny and reveal people’s propensity to point shoot and aim in that untidy order.

But some are revealing and one in particular is 100% required reading for anyone interested in electronic markets.

The writer introduces himself thusly:

I am Steve Wunsch, the principal inventor of two SEC‐regulated stock exchanges, the Arizona Stock Exchange “AZX” (originally called Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc. “WASI”) and the ISE Stock Exchange, both of which include dark pools. In fact, both of them, like all modern stock exchanges, have both lit and dark components and, thus, have provided me with potentially useful perspective on the dark pool question and on transparency in general. I will focus heavily on the latter, for it is impossible to understand the dark pool issues raised without understanding the value of transparency or, if improperly applied, the lack thereof. The AZX experience was, I believe, particularly instructive in this regard. Its highly transparent call market structure, combined with its unique regulatory status as a “low volume exempt”exchange, enabled me to see transparency and the role of regulation in promoting it from a perspective that I don’t believe anyone else has.

He deftly mixes snark and a historical perspective on regulation with an opinionated and informed view on the forces driving current equity markets’ microstructure arguing that the worst issues are due to regulatory failures.  He concludes, logically enough, that the SEC should be disbanded.  Perhaps his most inflammatory bit is his claim that the “SEC made Madoff.”  For effect, the section is entitled “An American Oligarchy”:

AN AMERICAN OLIGARCHY

It is not in the Commission’s interest to admit failures of policy, such as the ones I have described in this letter, and I have never seen it done. It was not in the Commission’s interest to admit that Bernie Madoff was the SEC’s most trusted and intimate confidante in formulating and selling transparency, electronic trading and
the whole NMS concept to Wall Street, the public and Congress. His legitimate business was the epitome of the kind of transparent electronic competition that NMS’s leveling policies were trying to create, and he occupied the most favored place of all industry advisors on policy and rules as NMS was being created. In a very real and literal sense, Madoff’s legitimate business and NMS were made for each other. NMS cleared a path for the application of continuous transparency by new electronic competitors, very visibly led by Madoff, enabling him to become at one time the third largest market in the United States, even though he wasn’t officially registered as anything but a broker‐dealer.

Had the SEC not emasculated the rules by which the NYSE controlled its members, Madoff would never have happened. In the time before NMS, when the exchange had Rule 390 or the stronger Rule 394 before it, diverting orders away from the floor or selling them to Madoff would have been banned. But on antitrust principles, the SEC wanted to foster NYSE‐busting competition in NMS, and Madoff became its PosterBoy for such competition. In order to make way for him, the SEC opened up a variety of loopholes that allowed orders to be diverted from NYSE to Madoff and printed on regionals like Cincinnati. Rules 19c‐1, 19c‐2 and 19c‐3 were in this vein. There were perennial attempts by the NYSE to plug the loopholes and rein in the membership, but the SEC batted them all away, enabling Madoff to continually grow his business. Eventually, the NMS environment forced the NYSE to abandon Rule 394, then Rule 390 and ultimately its membership organization altogether when it demutualized. This was all very good for Madoff. And Madoff was very good for NMS, giving it industry cred far in excess of what this poorly articulated socialist leveling theory could have had without his support.

In spite of a 457‐page SEC investigation into Madoff and how his Ponzi scheme was missed, the most obvious reasons were not considered, namely, that Madoff played a central role in helping the Commission design and sell NMS, and that NMS made him rich long before the Ponzi scheme. Most importantly, the credibility that theCommission’s collaboration with Madoff on NMS conferred on him was the principal factor enabling him to bring in money for the Ponzi scheme. Although the investigation’s report notes his credibility in the industry, it is mentioned as if itwere just a fact of life and was already there. Not mentioned is that his superior access to the SEC and apparent influence over the Commission, both of which were implicitly proved by his ability to get rich on NMS, are the most important reasons that he had such extraordinary credibility in the industry. The truth is that the SEC made Madoff. He could not have existed as a threat to investors without the Commission’s active and dedicated support over several decades.

Although, in typical blogger fashion, I’ve highlighted his spiciest claim, the rest of the letter is more technical and informative while just as entertaining.  I encourage you to read it and then engage in a thought experiment in which You are the designer of an electronic exchange and must balance the needs of a very heterogeneous set of users and stakeholders while ensuring transparency, liquidity, profitability, “fairness”, performance (he references an exchange targeting 100M executions per second) and utterly fail-safe transactional integrity…

I have embedded the full letter below the break…

Read more…

dereferenced, our managed markets

peaky

December 8th, 2009
messages per second across all feeds

messages per second across "all" feeds

I came across this compelling site which uses a hardware-based ticker plant (Exegy) in a colo environment to measure peak bandwidth across scads of NA feeds and then, every minute, updates a chart like the above to capture the average messages/sec across all of them.  Pretty swank.

While the uninformed may rail against colocation rather than focus on less intriguing issues like banana-variety corruption, they miss the basic point that colo can be done by anyone with the checkbook and the wish to do so.

unfair advantage?

unfair advantage?

It’s sort of like that boat in Forrest Gump.  Forrest wanted to be a shrimper.  So he invested in a boat.  With his initial capital, hard work, perseverance and a bit of luck, Forrest made a go of it.  He might easily have not made it. Colo is like that.  You can shrimp without a boat if you have a mask and fins, but it’s likely not a sustainable model… either way, it’s hard to see the harm in Gump’s boat.  Or colocation.

Hat-tip to Rodrick’s Web Log !! for spotting the market data peaks site.

dereferenced, market data, our managed markets

perfect crime

November 2nd, 2009

or: a computational complexity model for derivatives fraud

lemon law arbitrage?

lemon-law arbitrage?

Derivatives pricing has always been a notoriously complex, computationally expensive and potentially breathtakingly remunerative undertaking.  This is true enough for relatively vanilla, exchange-traded options, but once one goes off-market and starts applying creative financial engineering, it can get much more complicated.  Products like CDOs, CDSs, CDO^2s and their ilk have exploded in recent years creating opaque markets of trillions of notional dollars and accounting complexities we’re still only beginning to understand.

A recent paper, Computational Complexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial Products, by Arora, Barak, Brunnermeier and Ge take things a step or two further as they illustrate using information theory that it may be far worse than imagined as totally undetectable fraud can be engineered into these products.  They show that fraud with these products can be undetectable in the sense that the pricing process is a formally intractable problem when the informational asymmetry inherent in the development of these products is taken into consideration. In this context, “informational asymmetry” is a polite way of saying “fraud.”

The authors, from the Department of Computer Science and Center for Computational Intractability at Princeton (man, I want one of their business cards!), demonstrate that if the designer of, say, a CDO wants to cherry-pick amongst bundled assets to maximize their own return, they can do so in a way such that it would be impossible for a buyer of the derivative to know they were being stiffed.  The problem can be so hard that if you got the NSA’s mythic clusters humming on a pricing model, they might chug away until the sun falls from the sky before they accurately price it…  Co-author Rong Ge provides a FAQ to the paper here and I must hat-tip Andrew Appel for his informative post on the paper.

The “perfect crime” is a puzzle that has occupied the (criminal and otherwise) mind of many a bright and motivated soul from time immemorial.  While some may indulge towards the vulgar or base through violence or vice and others might ponder the perfect crime of passion, the cerebral Queen of Crime is surely some form of regulatory arbitrage: committing the crime for which the law has yet to be written or creatively engineering a legal loophole for a crime one has perpetrated or is about to perpetrate.  The developers of CDOs are to be lauded as it appears they have materially upped the state-of-the-art of the perfect crime.

hmmm… Is there a Nobel for that?

dereferenced, options pricing, our managed markets

meritocracy, redefined

August 25th, 2009
eveidently did something right...

the good news: in the US, we don't stigmatize failure...

Meritocracy is a system of a government or other organization wherein appointments are made and responsibilities assigned based on demonstrated talent and ability (merit)[1], rather than by wealth (plutocracy), family connections (nepotism), class (oligarchy), friendship (cronyism), seniority (gerontocracy), popularity (democracy) or other historical determinants of social position and political power. In a meritocracy, society rewards (by wealth, position, and social status) those who show talent and competence as demonstrated by past actions or by competition.


our managed markets

it’s not about microstructure

August 7th, 2009

Steal a little and they call you “thief”… Steal a lot and they call you “King” – Bob Dylan

I try to avoid the news during the trading day.  I never trade manually and as I’ve mentioned before, I’ve never yet had much success trading the news and none of our models presently use news feeds for decision-making.  So I really try to avoid keeping excessively abreast of the news as it’s just a distraction from real work.

would-be king

would-be king

That said, this morning I noted a pretty good jump in our pre-market p&l and wanted to see what splendid news had prompted the spike.  So I scanned some headlines.

On Bloomberg I saw:

U.S. Payroll Cuts Slow, Jobless Rate Unexpectedly Falls as Recession Eases

AIG Reports First Profit in Seven Quarters After Investment Losses Shrink

Dollar Advances as U.S. Employers Cut Fewer Jobs Than Economists Estimated

Unemployment down?  AIG profitable?  Dollar rumbling to strength?  Splendid, splendid and splendid.

I also saw the bit about Hank Greenberg paying the SEC $15M as he “thought it would be good to get it behind us.”  Indeed, good thinking.

And anyone looking at the news this week knows that regulators are likely going to put the kabosh on flash orders and that Goldman trades profitably.  (And they improve!)

now thats a fat tail...

my kind of fat tail

Read more…

dereferenced, our managed markets

the trading frequency spectrum

July 28th, 2009

I’ve been saving the above image in a stubbed-out blog post I’ve wanted to write since a conversation I’d had in Jerusalem last fall.  The recent attention to high frequency trading and all of its attendant evils has reminded me that the topic is relevant and so I relate various thoughts at the risk of jumping on a cacophonous bandwagon of rumbling misinformation.

First of all, the conversation.  It was with a talented guy who acted as the CFO for a variety of companies including a small startup hedge fund which traded US equities at a high frequency.   Although he was a part-time cfo, he seemed pretty plugged-into their trading operations and noted that they use an agency-only brokerage service for automated traders I’m familiar with and that they were “looking at full data for many” hundred stocks concurrently. He remarked that their trading was going well but that their hit rate was something like 4% and dropping.  By hit rate, he meant that they were placing limits frequently and generally pulling the orders if they didn’t get hit immediately.  He didn’t specify, but I imagine that “immediately” might range from milliseconds out to a second or twenty.  If the market is composed of makers and takers, then these guys were definitely makers of liquidity in the strict sense that they were placing limits and making markets.

At the time I thought it was interesting because it seemed that so many people were focused on the very, very short term trade that the frequency was becoming saturated.  It looked like a reminder that trading frequencies populate a spectrum; in this case, this part of the spectrum was becoming so saturated that returns were becoming increasingly difficult to obtain as more players crowded into it.  I’m not sure how this hedge fund has fared, but at the time I remember thinking that they were going to have a tough time competing if they were only geared for high-frequency trading as the space becomes increasingly expensive to play in as the inevitable talent and technology arms race marches on.

Lo and Khandani provide the below image illustrating this phenomenon happening to a class of contrarian strategies Lo & MacKinlay had described in 1990.  The strategies stop working as people squeeze out the alpha.

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hedge funds, our managed markets, startup, strategy development, technology

the other interesting thing about the Serge Aleynikov story

July 8th, 2009
his haunted house

as suspected, the seat of evil can be found in NJ

There’s a whole bunch of interesting things about this story of how a programmer has allegedly stolen some of the code at the place he’d worked.  One is the remarkable reverb it’s created amongst bloggers.  The house pictured left is evidently the diabolical mastermind’s home according to the NJ Real Estate Report.  Another is the fact that a programmer stealing some code is news. Funny what becomes news (apparently a fêted pedophile died) and what doesn’t (we are creating millions of refugees in Pakistan).

One angle that I haven’t seen highlighted in all of the commentary is Mr Aleynikov’s choice of weapon.  Seems that he was an erlang guy with an interest in ocaml.  Choosing functional programming for algo trading systems is an interesting but not unique choice.

Read more…

our managed markets, strategy development, technology

playing by the rules

April 13th, 2009

Competition has forever been fierce and at times may not be entirely fair.  Thus, a student of the market must be ever aware of the trends around them so they can promptly identify growing areas of opportunity which haven’t yet been revealed to the majority.  Mr Madoff made a very good living (while it lasted) offering clients a steady ~10% return on their investment.  Bush league stuff, it turns out.  The real maestros of money are doing rather better.

Accounting and legal researchers at the University of Kansas have identified a bull market in influence-peddling: returns on the order of 22,000% for firms who “invested” in lobbying efforts to favorably modify the tax code.  These people obviously learned that it’s important to play by the rules.

I’ve written some decent strategies and have been blessed with moments of great luck, but I’m ashamed to note that I’ve never gotten remotely close to these kinds of returns.  Can you imagine the sharpe ratio these guys can claim?  And it’s a repeatable process.  Although the Kansas researchers don’t mention it, there are many other cases of such legal arbitrage as pointed out in an AP piece on the subject:

The nonpartisan group recently released a study comparing the amount spent by bailed-out banks on political contributions and lobbying with the amount of money they got from the Wall Street rescue fund, known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The results produced eye-popping rates of return, an overall 258,449 percent for the $114 million they spent on campaign donations and lobbying.

Now this number – ~260,000% ROI – is clearly a bit inflated as $114M barely covers what Citi paid out to Mr Rubin for his services over the relevant period, but we’re probably in the ballpark.  Perhaps the banks only made 100,000% on their investment, but we can still see why they’re “the pros.”

I’m wracking my brains trying to figure out how to shoe-horn this marvelous alpha-generator into my trading algorithms.  I confess that I haven’t yet figured it out.  But I take solace in the knowledge that, as an American, I have the best government money can buy!

dereferenced, our managed markets

meet the new boss…

February 7th, 2009
the uniter revealed

one view on the important stuff

There seem to be two kinds of economists in today’s world.

Keynesians and Austrians?  Freshwater and saltwater? Macros and micros? Voodoos and uh well-adjusted?

No.  These may be valid distinctions ordinarily, but in today’s debate on how to solve the great self-inflicted wound known as the credit crisis the only two that matter are those who’ve worked for prop trading outfits (or perhaps more broadly, those who would someday like to once their time of public service is up) and those who just practice economics, typically academically.

Among the former, the solution is uniformly, as Mish so memorably put it, “to patch the busted dam with water” and to do it now or the consequences could be incomprehensibly bad.

Among the latter, the views are many and divergent, but they at least agree that throwing trillions of dollars about is a serious bit of work and should be undertaken with deliberation, transparency and a long view.

I’m not qualified to opine on which type of economist has a better chance of saving us from ourselves.  But I can observe that the only kind sitting at the decision-making side of our president, pre- or post- January 20th 2009, is the prop trader.

Read more…

dereferenced, our managed markets